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THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY OF INSIDER
TRADING: WHAT CONSTITUTES A "SIMILAR
RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE?"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission") uses, among other statutes, Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' to strictly regulate in-
sider trading.2 To enforce Section 10(b), the Commission
promulgated Rule 10b-5,' which provides "it shall be unlaw-
ful.., to engage in any... fraud or deceit... in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."4 There are two
primary theories of liability associated with Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Under the Classical Theory of 10b-5 liability, a
corporate insider' who trades on material,6 non-public infor-
mation in breach of a fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders violates Section 10(b).7 Under the Misappro-
priation Theory of 10b-5 liability, a corporate outsider8 who
trades on misappropriated material, non-public information
in breach of a fiduciary duty or "similar relationship of trust
and confidence"9 owed to the source of the information also
violates Section 10(b)."8
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78 p (1997).
2. See generally 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 513 (3d ed. 1995). See also C. EDWARD FLETCHER,
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 45 (1991).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
4. id.
5. Insiders include officers, directors, and other permanent officials of a
corporation, as well as attorneys, accountants, consultants and other people
who become temporary fiduciaries of a corporation. United States v. O'Hagan,
117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
6. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
8. Outsiders consist of those people who do not meet the definition of
"insider." See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
9. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991). See also
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
10. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
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Although lower courts have reviewed the issue of what
constitutes a "fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust
and confidence,"11 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in United States v. Chestman,"2 is the only
appellate court to specifically address the issue. In Chest-
man, the court held that in order to sustain a criminal prose-
cution under Section 10(b), the government must prove that
the misappropriator owed the source of the information the
functional equivalent of a fiduciary duty. 3 This comment
presents the view that the Chestman court's strict require-
ment, that a misappropriator breach a fiduciary duty to the
source of his information, is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's analysis of the Misappropriation Theory in United
States v. O'Hagan,"4 although the Supreme Court itself has
not specifically addressed the issue.
In order to facilitate this comment's analysis of the
Chestman decision, Part II presents the background of Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability by explaining the early de-
velopment of the Classical and Misappropriation theories, as
well as a review of the Chestman" and O'Hagan6 decisions.
Part III describes the issue addressed by this comment,
namely the inconsistency between the Chestman holding and
the Supreme Court's rationale in O'Hagan." Part IV pro-
vides an analysis of the statutory language of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, flaws in the Chestman analysis, and a de-
scription of how the Chestman holding is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's analysis in O'Hagan.18 Part V proposes
that courts should abandon the rule set forth in Chestman 9
in order to promote a Misappropriation Theory consistent
with United States v. O'Hagan.°
11. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
12. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
13. id. at 568.
14. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
15. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
16. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
17. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571; O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206-14.
18. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571; O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206-14.
19. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991).
20. 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-14 (1997).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Promulgation of 10(b) and 10b-5
The 73 rd Congress enacted two landmark pieces of legis-
lation, the Securities Act of 193321 (the 1933 Act) and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193422 (the 1934 Act), in order to
curb perceived abuses in the securities industry following the
Great DepressionY.2  "By the 1934 Act Congress purposed to
prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fair-
ness in securities transactions generally, whether conducted
face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges."24 While the
1933 Act regulates initial securities distributions and the
1934 Act generally governs post-distribution activity, both
"embrace a fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philoso-
phy of full disclosure for a philosophy of caveat emptor.
21
Until 1961, Section 16(b) 26 of the 1934 Act was the only
provision that the Commission used to regulate insider
trading.27 Section 16(b) regulates the buying and selling of
securities over a six month period.28 Under the rule, if an of-
ficer, director, or statutory insider 29 sells or buys stock within
six months of another purchase or sale, he must forfeit all
profits to the corporation, even if a net loss results from all
transactions." Furthermore, Section 16(b) is not limited to
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1997).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1997).
23. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994).
24. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc).
The House of Representatives committee that reported on the bill
which eventually became the Act did so with the observation that "no
investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon ex-
changes without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment
as to the value of the securities he buys or sells."
Id. at n.10 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 11, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)).
25. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1997).
27. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1997).
29. A statutory insider is a shareholder with at least 10% holdings in the
corporation's securities at the time he trades in the securities.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1997).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1997).
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the regulation of corporate insiders because a statutory in-
sider-ten percent shareholder-could have no access to ma-
terial corporate information and still be subject to liability."'
However, Section 16(b) does address the most dangerous as-
pect of insider trading, the incentive for insiders to create
volatility in the stock price in order to take advantage of
short-swing profits. 2
In 1961, the Commission held that liability for insider
trading could also be premised on Section 10(b)" of the 1934
Act. 14 Section 10(b) States:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
Pursuant to Section 10(b), which enables the Commission to
promulgate "rules and regulations [they] prescribe as neces-
sary," the Commission enacted Rule 10b-5"6 that provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud,
31. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 573 n.2 (Winter, J., dissenting). "Some
commentators have suggested that Section 16(b) is designed, or at least oper-
ates, to increase management's autonomy from shareholder control because it
limits the freedom of owners of large blocs of stock to trade and thus deters in-
stitutional investors from acquiring such blocs." Id. See also Roe, A Political
Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 27 (1991).
32. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997).
34. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C 907 (1961).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997) (emphasis added).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
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(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
The anti-fraud language of these two statutes is very
broad and does not specifically define what constitutes
"insider trading." Consequently, the interpretations of these
statutes have not developed systematically. 38 Instead, courts
have decided many notable cases that interpret the scope of
isolated portions of the language. 39  These cases have ad-
vanced two distinct theories of liability, the Classical Theory
and the Misappropriation Theory. Though this paper pri-
marily discusses the scope of the Misappropriation Theory
recently approved by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Hagan,4 ° it is helpful to first review the scope of the Classi-
cal Theory of 10b-5 liability.
B. The Classical Theory of 10b-5 Liability
The Classical Theory targets the breach of duty by a cor-
porate insider, permanent or temporary, to shareholders with
whom the insider transacts.4' In Cady, Roberts & Co.,42 the
Commission held that an insider must disclose to the market
all material inside information known to him or abstain from
trading, recognizing that some common law jurisdictions im-
pose on traditional insiders an "affirmative duty of disclo-
sure ... when dealing in securities."43 However, from the be-
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Shawn J. Lindquist, United States v. O'Hagan: The Eighth Circuit
Throws the Second Strike to the Misappropriation Theory of Rule 1OB-5 Liabil-
ity, 1997 B.Y.U.L. REV. 197, 199 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 45 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
40. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
41. See id. at 2207 (1997).
42. 40 S.E.C 907 (1961).
43. See id. at 911.
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ginning, 10b-5 liability has not been limited to the regulation
of "insider" trading. In Cady, the Commission also deter-
mined that other persons with access to inside information,
not just traditional corporate insiders such as officers, direc-
tors, or controlling shareholders, could be found liable under
Rule 10b-5."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the Cady rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher
Co.4 Directors, officers, and other corporate insiders were
held to have violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when they
amassed thousands of shares of Texas Gulf securities based
on material, non-public information.46 Despite the admoni-
tion of Texas Gulf Sulpher's president to keep information
regarding a lucrative mining operation confidential, defen-
dants purchased securities in the open market.47 The court
held that "anyone in possession of material inside informa-
tion must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is
disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate con-
fidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trad-
ing."48 Additionally, the court found the obligation to abstain
from trading does not cease as soon as a press release dis-
closing the confidential information is given, but continues
until the "news [may] reasonably [be] expected to appear over
the media of widest circulation, the Dow Jones broad tape."49
Therefore, one cannot escape liability until the material, °
non-public information is generally known throughout the
investing community.
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Chiarella v. United
States "' that the obligation to "disclose" or "abstain"2 in the
44. Id. at 912.
45. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 852-57.
47. Id. at 843-47.
48. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 854.
50. In order for the misstatement or omission of information to meet the
materiality requirement of 10b-5(b), the Supreme Court, borrowing from the
proxy statement context held that "there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable in-
vestor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made avail-
able." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
51. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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Classical Theory of insider trading liability is premised on a
relationship of trust and confidence between corporate insid-
ers and the shareholders of the corporation.53 In Chiarella,
the defendant was found not to have violated Section 10(b)
because he owed no affirmative duty to the injured share-
holders.54 Chiarella was a printer who deduced the names of
five corporate take-over targets from contracts submitted to
his firm.55 Based on this non-public information, he made
profits in excess of $30,000 by purchasing stock in these tar-
get companies and selling after the news was made public.56
Notably, the Court expressly left open the possibility of find-
ing Chiarella in violation of 10(b) under the Misappropriation
Theory, but saved such a ruling for another day because that
theory had not been submitted to the jury."
In Chiarella, the Court promoted the duty of traditional
insiders to disclose information before trading because such a
duty "guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obliga-
tion to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material,
nonpublic information."" However, the Court carefully
avoided creating a "general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, non-
public information. Formulation of such a broad
duty... should not be undertaken absent some explicit evi-
dence of congressional intent."59
While most insider trading cases brought under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are criminal actions pursued by the
government, ° the Supreme Court has held that Section 10(b)
52. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-30.
54. See id. at 231-33.
55. Id. at 224.
56. Id.
57. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2212 (1997). The Misappro-
priation Theory may have been used to find Chiarella guilty of violating Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he breached a duty owed to his employer, the
printer, when he converted non-public information for his own benefit. Id.
This breach would satisfy the deceptive device element of Rule 10(b)(5). Id. See
also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1980).
58. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
59. See id. at 233.
60. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 580 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
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and Rule 10b-5 also create a private right of action.61 How-
ever, the Court interpreted language of Section 10(b), "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"" as re-
quiring a plaintiff to have been either a purchaser or seller of
the corporation's securities in order to maintain a private ac-
tion. 3 Furthermore, the Court preserved the common law
requirement of reliance,64 although for publicly traded stocks
there is a rebuttable presumption of reliance on the material
misstatement or omission.65 Finally, in order for a plaintiff to
satisfy the "deceptive device"66 element required for private
actions under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must allege deceptive
and manipulative conduct.6" The Court reasoned that the
language of Section 10(b) that requires manipulation, decep-
tion or contrivance does not permit liability without scienter
or specific intent. 8
61. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
63. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731. "[V]irtually all lower federal courts
facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this question over
the past quarter century have reaffirmed [the] conclusion that the plaintiff
class for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private damage actions is
limited to purchasers and sellers." Id.
64. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
65. Id. at 247. This theory is generally referred to as "fraud on the market."
Id. "Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price,
an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore,
may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action." Id.
66. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
67. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
The language of Section 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception. Nor
have we been cited to any evidence in the legislative history that would
support a departure from the language of the statute. "When a statute
speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception.., and
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite un-
willing to extend the scope of the statute." Thus the claim of fraud and
fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as
"manipulative or deceptive" within the meaning of the statute.
Id.
68. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
The argument [that negligence will suffice] simply ignores the use of
the words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance,"-terms that
make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of con-
duct quite different from negligence. Use of the word "manipulative" is
especially significant. It is and was virtually a term of art when used
in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or will-
ful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
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As Cady held, the Classical Theory applies not only to
traditional insiders, but also to attorneys, accountants, con-
sultants, and other temporary fiduciaries of a corporation.69
The Supreme Court defined the scope of liability for outsiders
under the Classical Theory in Dirks v. SEC" Dirks, an in-
vestment broker in a New York firm who received material,
non-public information from an insider of Equity Funding,
alleged that the company vastly overstated its assets as a re-
sult of fraudulent corporate practices. 7' After many attempts
to expose this fraud and make the information public, Dirks
warned clients and investors to sell, which resulted in a liq-
uidation of over $16,000,000 in Equity Funding's stock 2
The Court rejected the Commission's broad theory that
would hold a "tippee" liable if he traded on material, non-
public information that he knew or should have known came
from a corporate insider, regardless of the insider's purpose
for disclosure.73 The Court acknowledged the analytical diffi-
culty of attaching a Cady duty to an outsider-tippee noting
that a typical tippee has no fiduciary relationship to the
shareholders of the corporation.74 Staying true to the decep-
tive device requirement of Rule 10b-5 liability, the Court held
that "some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly."7' A tippee receives his non-public information improp-
erly if the tipper-insider breaches a duty to his shareholders
by divulging the information for his own personal advan-
artificially affecting the price of securities.
Id.
69. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
70. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
71. See id. at 649.
72. Id. at 649-51.
73. Id. at 657.
In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both cases appears
rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal informa-
tion among all traders. This conflicts with the principle set forth in
Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be
barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion.
Id.
74. Id. at 655.
75. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
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tage.7 6
The Court stated the rule: "a tippee assumes a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of a corporation ... only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders
by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach."7 7 Be-
cause the record clearly showed that the tipper-insider of Eq-
uity Funding who divulged the information to Dirks did not
disclose the information for personal advantage, but to un-
cover an ongoing fraud, the "deception" requirement was not
met."8 It is clear from the Court's rulings on the Classical
Theory of insider trading that it is most concerned with cur-
tailing deceptive self-dealing in material, non-public corpo-
rate information.79
C. The Misappropriation Theory of 10b-5 Liability
Under the Misappropriation Theory, a person commits
fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and
thereby violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he mis-
appropriates non-public information in breach of a fiduciary
duty, or "similar relation of trust and confidence,""° owed to
the source of the information.8' The Commission first ad-
76. See id. at 662.
77. Id. at 660 (emphasis added). A fiduciary that assumes or inherits a
duty in this way is often referred to as a temporary fiduciary. See United
States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
78. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665.
It is undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity Funding,
with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. He took no ac-
tion, directly or indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of
Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. There was no ex-
pectation by Dirks' sources that he would keep their information in
confidence. Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally obtain the infor-
mation about Equity Funding. Unless the insiders breached their
Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic infor-
mation to Dirks, he breached no duty when he passed it on to investors
as well as to the Wall Street Journal.
Id.
79. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (requiring de-
ception in the case of a corporate insider). See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
662 (1983) (requiring deception in the case of a corporate outsider-tippee).
80. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a)).
81. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). See also
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484
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vanced the Misappropriation Theory subsequent to Justice
Burger's dissent from the Chiarella majority opinion." In his
dissenting opinion Burger wrote, "I would read [Section]
10(b) and Rule 10b-5... to mean that a person who has mis-
appropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to
disclose that information or to refrain from trading."83 Prior
to the Supreme Court's approval of the Misappropriation
Theory in United States v. O'Hagan,84 four circuits had ap-
proved the theory 5 and only two were opposed." The Second
Circuit, which decided United States v. Chestman," was the
first circuit to expressly adopt the theory.88
1. The Chestman Case
The facts of Chestman "read as if they were lifted out of
an exaggerated law school exam."" Robert Chestman, a
stockbroker, began placing trades for Keith and Susan Loeb
in 1982 when the Loebs decided to consolidate their holdings
in the Waldbaum family corporation. ° At that time, Keith
informed Chestman that Susan was the daughter of Julia
Waldbaum, a director and wife of the founder, and that she
was also the niece of Ira Waldbaum, president and control-
ling shareholder.9' After Ira had successfully negotiated a
sale of Waldbaum, Inc., he told Susan's mother, Shirley, that
he would tender her shares to the purchasing corporation but
that she had to keep the pending sale strictly confidential.92
After Susan questioned Shirley about a mysterious trip, due
to concerns for her mother's health, Shirley informed Susan
that the purpose of the trip was to pick up stock certificates
U.S. 19 (1987).
82. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-45.
83. See id. at 241.
84. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
85. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenblum, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
86. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) rev'd 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
87. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
88. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
89. David A. Lipton, Insider Trading with Impunity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1991, § 3, at 13.
90. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1991).
91. id.
92. Id.
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for the pending sale.93 Shirley subsequently admonished Su-
san not to tell anyone except for Keith, and Susan passed on
the same admonition to Keith.94
Despite Susan's admonition, Keith called Chestman the
next morning and told him that Waldbaum, Inc. was about to
be sold "at a substantially higher price than its market
value."95 Though Chestman initially refused to give Keith
any advice regarding the securities, he purchased shares for
himself and many of his customers' accounts, including the
Loebs.96 During a second conversation with Keith, Chestman
said that his own research confirmed that Waldbaum, Inc.
was a buy, and Keith subsequently purchased one thousand
more shares through Chestman.97 After the Commission
commenced an investigation into Waldbaum, Inc. securities,
Keith agreed to cooperate with the Commission against
Chestman, paying a $25,000 fine and disgorging the $25,000
profit he made from the transactions.98 Although the court
did convict Chestman for violating Rule 14e-3(a),99 which
regulates trading on the basis of information regarding ten-
der offers, this paper only discusses the court's reversal of
Chestman's conviction under the Misappropriation Theory of
10b-5 liability.'00
Chestman was convicted in district court for violating
Rule 10b-5 by aiding and abetting Keith Loeb's misappro-
priation of material, non-public information in breach of a
duty owed to the Waldbaum family and his wife Susan.'
The government conceded that Chestman's conviction de-
pended on a finding that Keith had misappropriated the in-
formation regarding the sale of Waldbaum.' Therefore, the
Chestman court had to grapple with one central issue:
whether "Keith Loeb breached a duty owed to the Waldbaum
93. Id. at 579 (Winter, J. dissenting).
94. Id. at 555.
95. Id. at 555.
96. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 554-56 (2d Cir. 1991).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997). As in the case of Rule 10b-5, the Com-
mission derives its authority to create Rule 14e-3 from the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1997).
100. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571.
101. Id. at 564.
102. Id.
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family or Susan Loeb based on a fiduciary duty or similar
relationship of trust and confidence.""3
The court's analysis first explained that the rationale for
the Misappropriation Theory's extension to fraud on the
source, even if the source is not affiliated with the buyer or
seller, is based on Rule 10b-5's language, "fraud or deceit
upon any person."14 It feared that this would be a particu-
larly broad expansion if a "similar relationship of trust and
confidence [were] construed liberally."0 5 Therefore, because
no appellate court had expanded fraud on the source to fa-
milial relationships, the Chestman court wished to "tread
cautiously in extending the misappropriation theory" to Keith
Loeb's appropriation of Waldbaum corporate information.'
Faced with the task of determining what constitutes a fi-
duciary duty or "similar relationship of trust and confidence,"
the court began with examining fiduciary duties.0 7 First, the
court followed a great amount of precedent by declaring that
merely entrusting someone with confidential information
does not create a fiduciary duty in the Rule 10b-5 context.' 8
Second, the court stated that marriage, without more, does
not create a fiduciary relationship; "rather, the existence of a
confidential relationship must be determined independently
of a pre-existing family relationship." 9 Finally, the court
listed several inherent fiduciary categories in which Keith
Loeb would not fit, including attorney and client, executor
and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, and trus-
tee and beneficiary."0
Unwilling to classify Keith Loeb as a fiduciary under the
common law, the court next considered the meaning of the
language, "similar relationships of trust and confidence." It
concluded that the word "similar" requires the relationship to
possess the same essential characteristics of a common law
103. Id.
104. Id. at 566. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997)).
105. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d. Cir. 1991).
106. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
107. id.
108. Id. See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 665 (1983); Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980). See also supra text accompa-
nying note 75.
109. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
110. See id.
299
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
fiduciary duty."' Again, the court insisted that such a simi-
lar relationship must entail more than just the entrustment
of confidential information."' Specifically, the majority
opinion stated that the similar relationship of trust and con-
fidence must be the "functional equivalent of a fiduciary
duty."
3
After essentially narrowing "similar relations of trust
and confidence" to fiduciary relations, the Chestman court
then explored the essential characteristics of a fiduciary rela-
tionship. "' First, it said that at the heart of a fiduciary rela-
tionship is "reliance and dominance or control.""' The court
explained that a fiduciary relationship is usually created
where one puts confidence in another and the person in turn
exerts some "superiority or influence ""' over the one who con-
fides. It finally resolved that a fiduciary, or similar relation-
ship is created when one person depends on another (the fi-
duciary) to serve his interests."7
However, the court backed off this seemingly rigid stance
in order to reconcile its opinion with a lower court case that
both the government and the defendant, Chestman, relied
on. 8  In United States v. Reed," 9 a son used confidential
statements about a tender offer made by his father, a mem-
ber of the board of directors of the offeror, to purchase call
options for a substantial profit.120 While the Reed's relation-
ship did not have the requisite "dependence and influence,"
the Chestman court seized on the fact that the Reeds
"customarily reposed information in each other," 21 holding
that "repeated disclosure of business secrets between family
members may substitute for a finding of dependence and in-
111. Id.
112. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 665 (1983); Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980). See also supra text accompanying note 75.
113. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991).
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 568-69 (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 125 (2d
Cir. 1982) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979)).
117. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991).
118. Id.
119. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477
(2d Cir. 1985).
120. Id.




Not only did Chestman detract from its requirement that
a "similar relationship" must bare the essential characteris-
tics of a fiduciary duty in order to reconcile itself with Reed,
but it admitted that courts have never strictly limited fiduci-
ary or confidential relationships.'23 "Equity has never bound
itself by any hard and fast definition of the phrase
'confidential relation' and has not listed all the necessary
elements of such a relation, but has reserved discretion
whenever it believes a suitable occasion has arisen."124 How-
ever, the majority maintained that while this ambiguity may
be preferable in a civil context to alleviate harsh results, it
has "no place in the criminal law."'25
Before applying the circumstances surrounding Keith
Loeb's use of material, non-public information to its analysis,
the majority concluded that the "core inquiry in a Rule 10b-5
criminal conviction [is] whether a fiduciary duty has been
breached,"126 completely leaving behind similar relationships
of trust and confidence. The court had "little trouble finding
the evidence insufficient" 127 to support a finding by the jury
that Keith Loeb had breached a strict common law fiduciary
duty. 28 In holding that Keith had no fiduciary-like associa-
tion with his wife and the Waldbaum family, the court found
that Keith was not part of the Waldbaum family inner circle
and the government "failed even to establish a pattern of
sharing business confidences between the couple." 29
In his dissent from the Chestman majority, Judge Winter
122. See id.
123. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
124. Id. See also United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 712 n.18 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (quoting C.G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 284-
86 (Rev. 2d ed. 1928)).
125. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991). The court
shared Justice Scalia's concern in his dissent from United States v. O'Hagan,
117 S. Ct. 2199, 2220 (1997), that such ambiguity offends the rule of lenity.
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570 (2d Cir. 1991). The rule of lenity
"provides that where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute concerning
multiple punishment, ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity in sen-
tencing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990). See also United States
v. Barrington, 662 F.2d 1046, 1054 (4th Cir. 1981).
126. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570 (emphasis added).
127. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir 1991).
128. See id.
129. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added).
1998]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
emphasized the following Cady requirements, which the
United States Court of Appeals approved:.. 1) the trader's
relationship giving him special access to corporate informa-
tion not intended for private use and 2) the unfairness re-
sulting from trading with those who lack the informational
advantage afforded by the special access.' Judge Winter
believed that because Keith benefited from the family's con-
trol of Waldbaum, his relationship was commercial as well as
familial.'32 When a corporation and a family are intertwined,
disclosure of non-public corporate information may be inevi-
table and may even be required to avoid misunderstand-
ings.'33 This purpose of maintaining informal interactions
"can hardly be fulfilled if there is no accompanying duty not
to trade." 4 Winter found that the majority's rule would
make a family-run corporation more susceptible to disclosure
than a public corporation and "expects family members to
behave like strangers toward each other."13'
2. The O'Hagan Case
In United States v. O'Hagan, 6 the United States Su-
preme Court expressly held for the first time that "criminal
liability under Section 10(b) may be predicated on the misap-
propriation theory."'37 James O'Hagan was a partner in a law
firm that represented Grand Met in a tender offer for the
Pillsbury Company, though he personally did not work on the
transaction.3 ' Based on material, non-public information he
obtained from his firm, O'Hagan transacted in Pillsbury se-
curities for a profit of over $4.3 million.3 9 In addition to be-
ing convicted for mail fraud and violating Rule 14e-3,"0
O'Hagan was convicted for violating Section 10(b), not be-
cause he breached a duty to the Pillsbury shareholders, but
130. See supra text accompanying note 45.
131. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 573 (Winter, J. dissenting).
132. See id. at 580-81.
133. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 579 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
134. id.
135. Id. at 580.
136. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
137. See id. at 2206.
138. Id. at 2205.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 99.
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because he breached a duty to his law firm by misappropri-
ating its confidential information.
14 1
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, began by out-
lining the main elements of a Section 10(b) action.14 ' First,
the defendant must have used a "deceptive device,"' though
the deception does not have to be of a purchaser or seller.1
4
Second, the deception must be "'in connection with"'" the pur-
chase or sale of any security.""6 The Court noted that the
Misappropriation Theory complements the Classical Theory
by targeting outsiders who trade on non-public information in
breach of a duty to the source of the information, satisfying
the deception requirement of Section 10(b).4 7  "In lieu of
premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between com-
pany insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock,
the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-
turned-traders deception of those who entrusted him with ac-
cess to confidential information."
4 8
The Court began its analysis by explaining what it be-
lieves is the central issue in a Section 10(b) case. "We ob-
serve, first" 49 that misappropriators deal in deception by pre-
tending loyalty to the source of the information while
converting non-public information for their personal gain."'
Unlike Chestman, which found that the existence of a. fiduci-
ary duty was the "core inquiry in a Rule 10b-5 criminal con-
viction,""' O'Hagan found that "[d]eception through non-
disclosure is central to the theory of [Section 10(b)] liabil-
ity."152 Indeed, Section 10(b) is "not an all-purpose breach of
fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving ma-
nipulation or deception.""' In explaining its rationale for fo-
cusing on deception, the Court said that a misappropriator
141. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205-06 (1997).
142. See id. at 2205.
143. Id. at 2206 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997)).
144. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
145. Id. at 2206 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997)).
146. Id. at 2206.
147. Id. at 2208.
148. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
149. See id. at 2208.
150. Id.
151. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991).
152. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
153. Id. at 2209.
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"gains his advantageous market position through deception;
he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously
harms members of the investing public."154
The Court next dealt briefly with the contention that the
language of Section 10(b), "in connection with the purchase or
sale... of any security""' limits liability to situations where
the defendant actually defrauds a purchaser or seller of secu-
rities. While the Court acknowledged that a purchaser or
seller might not be deceived in any way, it explained that the
deception used to misappropriate non-public information is
connected to a purchase or sale when the misappropriator
uses the information to transact in securities."' Therefore,
the "fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the
confidential information, but when... he uses the informa-
tion to purchase or sell securities.""7
While the Court often spoke in terms of breaching a fidu-
ciary duty to the source, the Court did not need to address
the issue specifically because O'Hagan had an indisputable
fiduciary relationship with his firm. The majority did say
that a "duty to disclose or abstain from trading 'arises from a
specific relationship between two parties, '""' but there is "no
general duty between all participants in market transactions
to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.""59
With respect to the fiduciary duty or similar relationship of
trust and confidence between a defendant and his source, the
Court inquires into whether there was an "expectation by
[the source] that he would keep their information in confi-
dence.' 60
The Supreme Court held that the Misappropriation The-
ory comports with one of the fundamental purposes of the
1934 Act: insuring the maintenance of fair and honest mar-
154. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997).
156. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 2212 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233
(1980)).
159. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 233 (1980)).
160. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2213 (1997) (quoting Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983)).
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kets as well as the promotion of investor confidence. 1 The
Court said that the theory is "designed to protec[t] the integ-
rity of the securities markets against abuses by
"outsiders"... who have access to confidential informa-
tion.' 162  A misappropriator's advantage comes from
"contrivance, not luck [and] cannot be overcome with re-
search or skill."'63 The Court concluded its discussion of the
purpose of Section 10(b) by conceding that informational dis-
parity is inevitable in the securities markets.' However,
Justice Ginsburg said that investors would think twice about
putting their money into a market where "trading based on
misappropriated, nonpublic information is unchecked by
law.' 65
Finally, the Supreme Court commented on the ambiguity
of Section 10(b) and the implications of that ambiguity on
criminal prosecutions. Congress has created two vital safe-
guards against the possible ambiguity of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in criminal prosecutions.16 6  Not only must the
government prove that the defendant willfully violated Sec-
tion 10(b), but the defendant also may not be imprisoned for
a violation of Rule 10b-5 if he proves that he had no knowl-
edge of the rule.'67 This requirement by Congress was cited
by the majority in O'Hagan66 to refute Justice Scalia's dis-
sent in which he claimed that the ambiguity of the statutes
does not "accord with the principle of lenity'6 9 [the Court ap-
161. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
162. Id. at 2207 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29
(1980)).
163. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
164. Id. at 2210-11.
165. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1997).
166. See id. at 2213-14.
167. Id. at 2214 n.12. Section 32 of the 1934 Act provides:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter... or
any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made un-
lawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this
chapter... shall upon conviction be fined not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both... ; but no person shall be
subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule
or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or
regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78ia) (1997).
168. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214.
169. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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plies] to criminal statutes."17 ° Therefore, in O'Hagan, the Su-
preme Court held that criminal liability under Section 10(b)
may be predicated on the Misappropriation Theory.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUE
Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Chestman,171 and the United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Hagan,7' recog-
nized that the Misappropriation Theory of insider trading is
a valid theory for prosecuting a Section 10(b) violation. In
determining the scope of the Misappropriation Theory, the
Chestman court found that one who trades on misappropri-
ated non-public information must owe the functional equiva-
lent of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information in or-
der to be prosecuted for violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.173 However, the Supreme Court's validation of the Misap-
propriation Theory did not require it to address that issue, as
James O'Hagan unquestionably owed a fiduciary duty to his
law firm. Therefore, the issue discussed in this comment is
whether, in light of the rationale presented in O'Hagan, the
Chestman court's limited interpretation of the Misappropria-
tion Theory, which includes the strict requirement of a fidu-
ciary duty, should be followed or rejected by other courts.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Chestman court's strict requirement that a misap-
propriator of material, non-public information breach a fidu-
ciary duty to the source is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's analysis of the Misappropriation Theory in O'Hagan.
First, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not expressly require a
fiduciary duty and it is not reasonable to imply such a re-
quirement for the Misappropriation Theory. 74  Second,
Chestman's analysis and reasoning for requiring a strict fidu-
ciary duty has several fundamental flaws.'75  Third, in
170. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2220 (1997) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
171. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
172. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
173. See supra text accompanying note 113.
174. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
175. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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O'Hagan, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of
the "deceptive device" 176 requirement rather than duty in ap-
proving the Misappropriation Theory.177 Fourth, all of the
policy justifications cited by the Supreme Court in approving
the Misappropriation Theory would be compromised if
178Chestman's narrow holding were followed in other circuits.
Finally, the Chestman court's concern that the ambiguity of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 warrants a narrow interpreta-
tion of fiduciary duty in criminal cases was expressly allevi-
ated in O'Hagan.7 9
A The Language of 10(b) and 10b-5
The Language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not
warrant a strict requirement that a misappropriator breach a
fiduciary duty to the source. These statutes only require that
the misappropriator's conduct constitutes a "deceptive de-
vice," 8° and that it is "connect[ed] with the purchase or sale
of any security."8' In Chiarella, the Supreme Court found
that in order to satisfy the deceptive device requirement of a
Section 10(b) action under the Classical Theory, a traditional
insider trading on material, non-public information must owe
a fiduciary duty to the injured shareholders.'82 The Court did
not create a new fiduciary duty requirement in doing so, but
simply acknowledged that the insider's trading on material,
non-public information is not deceptive unless he has a duty
not to trade.'83 What makes the insider's failure to disclose
the confidential information or abstain from trading decep-
tive is the betrayal of a relationship of trust and confidence
between a corporate insider and the corporation's sharehold-
184
ers.
Though the Supreme Court specifically avoided creating
a "general duty between all participants in market transac-
tions to forgo actions based on material, non-public informa-
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997).
177. See discussion infra Part JV.C.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
179. See discussion infra Part TV.E.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997).
181. See id.
182. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 228-29.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tion"89 under the Classical Theory, narrowly construing this
language with respect to the Misappropriation Theory would
be equally unwarranted. While the Court found that a
"specific relationship between two parties"8 ' is necessary to
make the insiders conduct deceptive, it is not a reasonable
construction of Section 10(b) to say that an outsider's be-
trayal of his wife's (a specific relationship) confidence is not
deceptive. The language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 re-
quires deception, not a fiduciary duty.'87 Therefore Chest-
man's emphasis on the fiduciary relationship88 in a misap-
propriation case is an unfounded interpretation of the
statutes.
B. The Flaws in the Chestman Analysis
The Chestman court reasoned that a fiduciary duty is
necessary to sustain a Section 10(b) violation,'89 but it left
several fundamental flaws in its analysis. The court first
conceded that the inquiry should be whether the information
was misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty or "similar
relationship of trust and confidence." 9 ° However, the court
reasoned that the word "similar" should be interpreted to
mean that a misappropriator's relationship to the source
should possess the same essential characteristics of a tradi-
tional common law fiduciary duty.' Concluding that a
similar relationship of trust and confidence must be the func-
tional equivalent of a fiduciary duty,'92 the Chestman court
essentially nullifies the "similar relationship" language, ren-
dering it superfluous.'93 Because this language was devel-
oped by the Supreme Court specifically for the Section 10(b)
liability context,' Chestman's virtual dismissal of it is inap-
propriate.
185. Id. at 233.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991). The ma-
jority in Chestman said the issue of whether a fiduciary duty exists is
"frequently the core inquiry in a Rule 10b-5 criminal conviction." id.
189. See discussion supra Part II.B.
190. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 564.
191. Id. at 568.
192. Id.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
194. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (emphasis added).
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Not only was the Chestman court's narrowing the scope
of the misappropriator-source relationship inappropriate, but
its examination of the essential characteristics of a fiduciary
duty left much to be desired. First, relying on another Sec-
ond Circuit decision, United States v. Margiotta,'95 the court
narrowed the scope of fiduciary duty to a relationship charac-
terized by reliance, dominance, and control. 196 However, the
Margiotta decision only addressed the specific issue of when
a governmental official's relationship with the general citi-
zenry becomes fiduciary, not fiduciary duties in general.97
Second, the court used Black's Law Dictionary to support its
limited definition, 98 but ignored Black's statement that
"'fiduciary relation' is a very broad term embracing both
technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations in
which one trusts in or relies on another."9  One would have
to consider Keith Loeb a traditional fiduciary under this re-
laxed definition, for surely he and his wife shared at least an
"informal relation." Third, limiting the characteristics of the
fiduciary relationship to dominance and control ignores the
simplest of fiduciary relationships, the partnership. Though
in a simple partnership neither partner necessarily exerts
control over the other, their fiduciary relationship is consid-
ered a duty of the "highest kind."00 Finally, though Chest-
man admits the courts have always loosely applied the fidu-
ciary relationship in order to avoid harsh results, it chose not
to follow this tradition in a criminal case.20 While the court's
concern about an ambiguous criminal statute may be valid, it
is not reasonable to limit the definition of "fiduciary" so far
that it eliminates many traditional fiduciary relationships.
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the Chestman
analysis is the court's willingness to retreat from its new
strict definition of fiduciary in order to reconcile its opinion
195. 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d. Cir. 1982).
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979)).
199. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990).
200. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Judge Cardozo's de-
scription of the standard of behavior governing a fiduciary in a partnership as
"the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive" remains the classic definition. Id.
201. See discussion infra Part I.E.
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with United States v. Reed."' As soon as the court declared
that the essential characteristics of the fiduciary relationship
are control and dominance, it conceded that the repeated dis-
closure of information may substitute for a finding of depend-
ence and influence. °3 Despite the fact that this concession
did not logically flow from the court's creation of a strict and
unambiguous definition of "fiduciary," it is not clear why
Keith and Susan Loeb's marriage, which must have enjoyed
regular disclosure of information, could not satisfy this defi-
nition. While the court found the government had failed to
show a "pattern of sharing business information" between
Keith and Susan, the record reflects that they handled their
Waldbaum securities jointly' 4 and it is unreasonable to sug-
gest that a husband and wife would not openly discuss their
financial affairs. 05
C. The "Deceptive Device"
In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court emphasized the impor-
tance of the "deceptive device" requirement rather than duty
in approving the Misappropriation Theory.0 6 The Court rec-
ognized that the Misappropriation Theory "premises liability
on a party's deception of those who have given him privileged
access to confidential information."07 Furthermore, it found
that "deception through nondisclosure is central to [Section
10(b)] liability."2 8 Because Keith Loeb had a relationship of
trust and confidence with his wife that gave him privileged
access to confidential information, he should have been found
liable under the Misappropriation Theory.
The Supreme Court said this deception is connected to a
202. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477
(2d Cir. 1985). In United States v. Reed, a son was convicted of misappropriat-
ing information from his father despite the fact that they did not have a tradi-
tional fiduciary relationship. id.
203. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991).
204. Id. at 555. "Keith Loeb first sought Chestman's services in 1982, when
Loeb decided to consolidate his and his wife's holdings in Waldbaum, Inc." Id.
(emphasis added).
205. Id. at 580 (Winter, J., dissenting).
206. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1997). "We observe,
first, that misappropriators ... deal in deception." Id.
207. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability
for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 124 (1984).
208. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
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purchase or sale of securities when the misappropriator uses
the material, nonpublic information to buy securities.2"9 The
Chestman court found that Keith's conduct did not qualify as
deceptive because he did not solicit the information or induce
Susan to convey it to him.210 However, the Supreme Court
did not need to inquire into whether James O'Hagan solicited
the information from his law firm. Rather, as just men-
tioned, the Court looks to see whether the misappropriator
was given privileged access to the information. Furthermore,
as Judge Winter noted in his dissent, "Chestman's and Loeb's
concerns were not about commercial wisdom, but ... about
the propriety of Loeb's trading on the 'definite' and 'accurate'
information."2 ' Keith Loeb had access to confidential infor-
mation and knew he was betraying his wife's confidence
when he spoke to Chestman about the pending sale of Wald-
baum.212 As the O'Hagan court affirmed,"' such a "deception"
violates Section 10(b) when it is used "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.""4
In deciding whether a defendant employed a "deceptive
device" by betraying a confidential relationship, the Court
looks to see whether there was an "expectation by the sources
that he would keep their information in confidence." 5 Susan
"cautioned [Keith] not to tell anyone because 'it could possi-
bly ruin the sale."'216 She indicated they "had shared confi-
dences in the past and that on each such occasion they had
indicated to each other that the confidences would be re-
spected."2"7 Clearly the source, Susan, expected the non-
public information to be kept confidential. Keith's betrayal of
Susan's confidence satisfied the "in connection with" re-
quirement when he purchased Waldbaum securities on the
basis of the information he misappropriated from her. There-
fore, Keith's conduct satisfies the requirements emphasized
209. Id. at 2209.
210. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991).
211. Id. at 581 (Winter, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1997).
215. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665
(1983)).
216. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1991).
217. See id. at 579 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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by the O'Hagan court in approving the Misappropriation
Theory.
D. The Policy Justifications
In addition to satisfying the statutory requirements for
liability outlined in O'Hagan, Keith's betrayal of the
"relationship of trust and confidence" he shared with his wife
should be deemed a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
in order to fulfill the policy justifications of those laws. In
O'Hagan, the Supreme Court said that the purpose of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 was to insure the maintenance
of fair and honest markets while promoting investor confi-
dence.21 A finding that Keith Loeb's conduct constituted
misappropriation for the purpose of Section 10(b) does not
mean that all investors should have equal access to all infor-
mation. That may well be impossible.219 However, not hold-
ing Loeb's conduct in violation of Section 10(b) would com-
promise the policy justifications for the Misappropriation
Theory enunciated in O'Hagan, because his conduct does not
support an honest market. Investor confidence will certainly
be negatively affected if an entire class of people with the
type of access to inside information that Keith Loeb enjoyed
is able to trade on that information without fear of prosecu-
tion."'
Despite the fact that Keith Loeb may not have met the
traditional definition of fiduciary, the "similar relationship of
trust and confidence" he shared with his wife gave him access
to confidential information.22' The Supreme Court announced
218. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1997).
219. id.
220. Id. "Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities
markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by
law." Id.
221. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.
dissenting).
The Law may have been reluctant to recognize obligations based solely
on family relationships [because of] concern that intra-family litigation
would exacerbate strained relationships and weaken rather than
strengthen the sense of mutual obligation underlying family relation-
ships. This concern, however, is of no weight where insider trading is
concerned. In such cases, the litigation is almost universally brought
by the government or third party.
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that the Misappropriation Theory is "designed to protect the
integrity of the securities markets against abuses by outsid-
ers to a corporation,"222 like Keith Loeb, who are given "access
to confidential information that will affect the corporation's
security price when revealed.""22 A person in Keith Loeb's po-
sition, who gains access to confidential information from
some non-fiduciary, though specific,224 relationship, through
"contrivance not luck,"225 should be prosecuted for violating
Section 10(b). The advantage gained by Keith Loeb through
his contrivance, or scheme, with Robert Chestman could not
have been "overcome with research or skill."26 Therefore, the
O'Hagan Court's policy justifications for the Misappropria-
tion Theory will be compromised if people in Loeb's and
Chestman's position are not prosecuted, as investors will ei-
ther refrain from trading or incur costs to protect themselves
from the negative affects of such misappropriation.2
E. The Criminal Law Implications
The O'Hagan Court expressly dealt with the Chestman
court's criminal prosecution concern regarding the ambiguity
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.228 Though the Chestman
majority admits that courts have "never bound [themselves]
by any hard and fast definition of the phrase confidential re-
lation,"229 it felt that such an elastic definition would offend
Id. at 580
222. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1997).
223. See id.
224. Id. at 2212 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233
(1980)). "[W]e said, a duty to disclose or abstain from trading 'arises from a
specific relationship between two parties.'" O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212
(emphasis added).
225. Id. at 2210.
226. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1997) (quoting Brud-
ney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979)). "If the market is thought to
be systematically populated with ... transactors [trading on the basis of mis-
appropriated information] some investors will refrain from dealing altogether,
and others will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors .... Id. See
also Aldave, supra note 207, at 122-23.
227. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
228. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1997).
229. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991). See also
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp 685, 712 n. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting G.G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 284-86 (Rev. 2d ed.
1978)).
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the rule of lenity usually afforded criminal prosecutions.23 °
Similarly, Justice Scalia in his dissent from O'Hagan felt the
principle of lenity requires the "unelaborated statutory lan-
guage: '[t]o use or employ in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance,"' be limited to parties of the transaction, not
an unrelated source.31
The majority in O'Hagan opposed Scalia's argument
based on two "sturdy safeguards" created by Congress
against the ambiguity of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.232
Those safeguards require the government to prove a defen-
dant willfully violated Section 10(b) and provides that a de-
fendant may not be imprisoned if he proves he had no knowl-
edge of Rule 10b-5.233  The statute's "requirement of the
presence of culpable intent ... does much to destroy any
force in the argument that application of the [statute] in a
[criminal prosecution] such as O'Hagan's is unjust."2 34 Be-
cause the Chestman court relied heavily on the criminal as-
pect of the case in order to forge a very narrow definition of
"fiduciary relationship," that definition should be repudiated
after O'Hagan's recognition of the congressional safeguards
against such statutory ambiguity.
V. PROPOSAL
The language of Rule 10b-5 provides that "it shall be
unlawful.., to engage in any.., fraud or deceit.., in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security., 211 It is
reasonable to require an "insider" to breach a fiduciary duty
to shareholders in order to make his conduct "deceptive."
Without requiring such a duty, there would be no betrayal of
a relationship of trust and confidence. However, "outsiders"
who misappropriate non-public information usually steal
from a source with which they already have a specific rela-
230. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570. See also discussion of the rule of lenity su-
pra note 125.
231. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2220 (1997) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
232. See id. at 2213.
233. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
234. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214.
235. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
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tionship, such as father-son,236 husband-wife,23 or employer-
employee. 38 Surely, such a betrayal of a relationship of trust
and confidence, despite the possible lack of traditional fiduci-
ary qualities, satisfies the "deceptive device" requirement of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Courts should embrace the policies enunciated in
O'Hagan and repudiate Chestman's strict requirement of a
fiduciary-like duty for the Misappropriation Theory of insider
trading. By holding that the "deceptive device" requirement
is satisfied whenever a relationship of trust and confidence is
betrayed, courts will further the Supreme Court's policy of
maintaining fair and honest markets while promoting inves-
tor confidence." 9 Of course, there is great need for regulatory
or congressional clarification in the area of insider trading.24°
At the very least, the Commission ought to exercise its rule
making authority by specifying what types of relationships,
both insider and outsider, are subject to 10b-5 regulation.
Until Congress or the Commission makes such a clarification,
courts ought to interpret the "deceptive device" requirement
liberally in order to curb the abuse of securities markets 4'
and promote the policies enunciated by the Supreme Court in
O'Hagan.242
VI. CONCLUSION
As the exposition of the Classical Theory and Misappro-
priation Theory in Part II makes clear, 43 courts have tradi-
tionally been concerned with individuals gaining an advan-
tage over the market through deception. Part IV
demonstrates that the Supreme Court, in United States v.
O'Hagan,244 shared that concern and approved the Misappro-
236. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
237. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir 1991).
238. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
239. See id. at 2210 (1997).
240. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983). "This rule is inherently
imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering their actions in ac-
cord with legal requirements." id.
241. See supra text accompanying note 23.
242. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
243. See discussion supra Part II.
244. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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priation Theory in order to protect investors and insure the
honesty of markets. '45 This comment contends that the strict
holding of United States v. Chestman,246 requiring the breach
of the functional equivalent of a fiduciary duty in a Section
10(b) action, 4 ' only impedes the Supreme Court's policies
aimed at promoting fair and honest markets. '48 Therefore,
until Congress or the Commission takes legislative action to
clarify what types of relationships are governed by Section
10(b), courts should liberally construe the Supreme Court's




245. See discussion supra Part IV.
246. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
247. Id.
248. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
249. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
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